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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical scenarios:
(1) At 1:00 a.m. on a weekday morning, a time when emotionally
distraught persons are likely to be watching television, an attorney appears
on the television screen urging viewers to call for legal help in obtaining a
divorce;'
(2) The mother of a child who suffered brain damage as the result of an
automobile accident receives three letters from attorneys saying she may have
a case for wrongful death; 2
(3) An attorney, after learning of an airline crash, drives to the accident

* Editor's Note: This note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award for the
outstanding note for Fall 1995.
** This note is dedicated to my husband Ken Brace, my sister, Monica Perry, and my
parents, Carmen and Robert Wooten for their support throughout the writing of this note.
1. Attorneys have begun to target their television advertising campaigns. See Kenneth
Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 723,
741 (1994) (exploring new ways attorneys market their services). Because people with marital
problems often have trouble sleeping, they are more likely to be watching television late at
night. Id.
2. One commentator has stated that "such a letter clearly offends common decency."
Richard Sanders, Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation: The Good, the Bad, the Unethical,50
OR. ST. B. BULL. 5, 5 (1990) (examining cases where attorneys zealously pursued clients
through targeted direct-mail solicitation).
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site and passes out business cards.'
Though the three scenarios exemplify different methods of attorney
marketing, the underlying issue raised by all three is the same: what should
we allow attorneys to do when they want to market their legal services? The
U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of how much attorney
marketing can be regulated by state bar associations in The FloridaBar v.
Went For It, Inc. 4 In Went For It, Inc., attorneys challenged the constitutionality of a Florida ethics rule 5 banning targeted, direct-mail, attorney
advertisements for thirty days following personal injury or wrongful death.6
Although Went For It, Inc. appears to involve a narrow issue, relating only
to one type of attorney marketing, it is actually part of a longstanding
controversy surrounding restrictions on attorney marketing.' The Went For
It, Inc. decision could be an important move by the Court toward allowing
states to severely regulate attorney marketing.
In order to understand the possible impact of the Court's Went For It,
Inc. decision, it is important to understand the history of attorney marketing.'
The legal profession has traditionally been opposed to attorney advertising
and solicitation.9 The ideal form of attorney marketing was for the attorney
to develop a reputation, for business to come to the attorney and not vice
versa. " The ban on attorney advertising began as a rule of etiquette and
later developed into a rule of ethics." Attorneys saw themselves as above
12
"trade" and performing a public service, not as merely earning a living.
The first written ethical rules banning attorney marketing came in 1908
when the American Bar Association (ABA) drafted the Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics.13 The Canons prohibited all forms of attorney
3. Although this is a hypothetical situation, similar conduct was reported after the crash
of a Northwest airplane in Detroit on Aug. 16, 1987. See Eric S. Roth, Confronting
Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 967, 972 (1989) (describing
cases in which attorneys have solicited clients shortly after mass torts). A man posing as a
priest talked to the families of victims at the crash site. Id. The "priest" also handed out the
business card of a Florida attorney. Id.
4. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
5. At issue were Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7-8(a) of the FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, which when read together provide a blanket prohibition against any attempt by an
attorney to contact an accident victim for 30 days after an accident.
6. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
7. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 5, 210-73 (1953) (examining the history of
bans on attorney marketing).

8. Id.
9. See Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by
Attorneys, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 357, 361 (1995) (looking at history of the ABA's
suppression of attorney advertising and solicitation).
10. See DRINKER, supra note 7, at 212-14.

11. Id.
12. Id; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977).
13. ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1908) [hereinafter CANONS].
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advertising.1 4 The next set of major attorney marketing rules came in 1969
when the ABA drafted the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility(Model
Code), which was adopted by every state.'5 The Model Code, like the
Canons, banned all forms of attorney advertising. 16 In 1983, the ABA
approved the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 7 Since
then, sixty-five percent of the states have enacted professional attorney codes
based on the Model Rules.'8 The Model Rules allow attorneys to advertise
their services but severely restrict in-person solicitation.' 9 The ABA
amended both the Model Code and the Model Rules in response to U.S.
Supreme Court decisions but retained as much regulation as was allowed by
the Court.2 °
A pivotal decision that forced bar associations to reexamine their attorney
marketing rules came in 1977,21 when the U.S. Supreme Court extended
First Amendment freedom of speech protection to attorney advertising.2 2
The First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects freedom of speech. 23 The Court has held that the
First Amendment protects speech even when such speech is in the form of
a paid advertisement.24 Commercial speech, the Court rationalized, must be
protected because it serves the important function of informing the public of

14. CANONS, supra note 13, No. 27 (stating, "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young attorney, and especially for his brother attorney, is the
establishment of a well merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity. This cannot
be forced, but must be the outcome of character conduct .....
15. See Snyder, supra note 9, at 360.
16. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1969) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE] (providing in relevant part, that "a lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be
prepared, use or participate in the use of, any form of public communication ... calculated
to attract lay clients").
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
18. See Snyder, supra note 9, at 361.
19. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rules 7.1-.3 (1995) (pertaining to attorney marketing).
Rule 7.1 reads in pertinent part, "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." Rule 7.2 reads in pertinent part that "subject
to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through public
media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor
advertising, radio or television, or through written or recorded communication." Rule 7.3(a),
pertaining to attorney solicitation, reads in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not by inperson or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."
20. See Snyder, supra note 9, at 366.
21. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
22. Id. at 381-82.
23. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939).
24. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
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products and services. 25 Like other forms of commercial speech, attorney
advertising informs the public of the availability of a service. 26 The Court
held that attorney disciplinary rules suppress commercial speech that could
inform the public .27 Thus, the Court concluded that restrictions on attorney
marketing are to be analyzed using First Amendment commercial speech
doctrines.2 8
Since deciding that attorney marketing deserves some constitutional
protection, the Court has taken a piecemeal approach to restrictions on
attorney marketing. 29 The Court has chosen to give varying degrees of
constitutional protection to the different forms of attorney marketing.30 In
a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has categorized the types of attorney
marketing that may or may not be regulated or prohibited, 3' including
attorney advertising, 32 attorney solicitation, 3 and targeted advertise35
ments.34 The Court struck down a complete ban on attorney advertising
but allowed a prophylactic ban of attorney solicitation. 36 The Court also
allowed targeted, newspaper 37 and direct-mail solicitations.3 8 In Went For
It, Inc., the Court upheld yet another form of restriction on attorney
marketing, that is, time-limited bans on direct-mail advertisements. 9
This note examines the Supreme Court's efforts to guide state disciplinary organizations in imposing limits on attorney marketing. Part II analyzes
the Court's imposition of First Amendment protection on attorney advertising. Part III examines the Court's allowance of prophylactic bans on
attorney, in-person solicitation. Part IV looks at the Court's approach toward
targeted advertisements. Part V examines the impact of the Court's decision
in Went For It, Inc. on the freedom of attorneys to market their services.

25. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)
(prohibiting a ban on pharmacists advertising the price of their products).
26. Bates, 433 U.S. at 365.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988) (disallowing a
complete ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (disallowing a ban of targeted, newspaper advertisements); Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 448 (1978) (allowing a prophylactic ban of attorney,
in-person solicitation).
30. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 448.
31. Id.
32. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
33. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 448.
34. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651-53.
35. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
36. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 448.
37. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651-53.
38. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 471.
39. Went ForIt, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
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II.

ADVERTISING: COMMERCIAL SPEECH ANALYSIS

A.

Bans on Attorney Advertising Prohibited

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 0 opened the door for attorney advertisements.4 ' In Bates, the Supreme Court disallowed blanket suppression of
attorney advertisement. 2 Concluding that attorney advertisements deserved
the same kind of First Amendment protection as other forms of commercial
speech,43 the Court held that an outright ban on attorney advertising violated
the First Amendment." It, however, was careful to limit its holding by
asserting that attorney advertising could be regulated but not banned.45
In Bates, the two petitioners were attorneys who operated a law office
they called a "legal clinic" in Phoenix.46 The petitioner attorneys intended
to offer low-priced legal services to individuals of moderate income for
routine cases. 47 The petitioners operated the legal clinic for two years and
concluded that the practice and clinical concept needed advertisement in
order to survive.48
Accordingly, the petitioners placed an advertisement for their legal
services in their local daily newspaper.49 The advertisement offered legal
services at "very reasonable fees" and listed the fees for legal services,
including uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal
bankruptcies, and changes of name. 0 Consequently, the state bar determined that the advertisement was a violation of an Arizona Bar rule banning
attorney advertisement.5
As a penalty for the violation, the Board of
40. Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
41. Id. at 365.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see David F. McGowan, Comment: A CriticalAnalysis of Commercial Speech,
78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 369 (1990) (examining the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine
in the Supreme Court).
44. Bates, 433 U.S. at 365.
45. Id. at 383.
46. Id. at 354.
47. Id.
48. Id. Because the appellants offered their legal services as low rates, they depended on
volume to generate income. Id.
49. Id. The attorneys placed the advertisement in the ARIZONA REPUBLIC. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 355. The disciplinary rule provided in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city
or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIz. REV. STAT. P26 (Supp. 1976).

114

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

Governors of the Arizona State Bar recommended a one-week suspension for
each petitioner.5 2 The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the decision to
discipline the petitioners but reduced the sanction to censure only.53
In an opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun, the U.S. Supreme Court
held first that the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraints on competition, did
not prohibit state bar actions to ban attorney advertising. 4 The Court then
addressed the First Amendment issues brought by the petitioners." The
Court analyzed the problem of restrictions of attorney advertising, using the
same reasoning the Court developed to apply to restrictions on commercial
speech. 6 It stated that attorney advertising, like commercial speech, is
entitled to some First Amendment protection. 7
Interestingly, the Court did not clearly spell out the test it would use to
determine if the limit on attorney advertisement violated the First Amendment.5
The Court did, however, examine the various justifications
proposed by the Arizona bar for prohibitions of attorney advertising to see
if they sufficed.59 The Court found none of the interests asserted was strong
enough or sufficiently affected by lawyer advertising to justify a prohibition
of advertising.'
6
The adverse effect of attorney advertising on attorney professionalism,
the first of the Arizona Bar's assertions, was rejected by the Court as
outdated. 62 The Court also rejected the second assertion that attorney
advertisement is inherently misleading. 63 The Court said that attorney

52. Bates, 433 U.S. at 358.
53. Id. Appellants were entitled to seek review with the Supreme Court of Arizona under
the Arizona Supreme Court's Rule 37. Id. at 356.
54. Id. at 359-63. The Court noted that a state can impose restraints as an act of
government not reached by the Sherman Act. Id.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51
(1943) (establishing the state action exception to the Sherman Act); see also Virginia
PharmacyBd., 425 U.S. at 770 (holding that "Virginia is free to require whatever professional
standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition
in other ways").
55. Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-82.
56. Id. The Court particularly likened Bates to Virginia Pharmacy Bd. Id. In Virginia
Pharmacy Bd., the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prevented pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug price information. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 770.
57. Bates, 433 U.S. at 381-82.
58. See id. at 366-84.
59. Id. at 368-79.
60. Id. at 379.
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. "We find the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true
professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys
must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their
livelihood at the bar." Id.
63. Id. at 372.
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advertisement could be framed so as not to be misleading. 6" Third, the
Court found no adverse effect on the administration of justice.65 In fact, it
reasoned that advertising may help the administration of justice by informing
the potential consumer of the availability of services. 66 Fourth, the Court
found that advertising had no undesirable economic effects 67 and said that
attorneys who are isolated from the competition generated by advertising are
more likely to cause a rise in prices. 68 Fifth, the Court rejected the notion
that advertising could have an adverse effect on the quality of legal
service.69 It determined that attorneys who are inclined to do shoddy work
will do so regardless of the availability of advertising.7 ° Finally, the Court
rejected difficulties of enforcement 71 as a reason to limit speech and
reasoned that undue enforcement problems need not be anticipated.72 In
sum, the Court found that the justifications promoted by the Bar were all
inadequate to sustain a constitutional challenge on the statute banning
attorney advertisement.7 3
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist
dissented with the majority's holding that attorney advertisement is protected
by the commercial speech doctrines.7" Chief Justice Burger feared that
attorney advertisement would injure the general public which needs legal
services. 75 He further reasoned that the public needs protection from
attorneys who would prey on the uninformed.76 Justice Powell, in his
dissenting opinion in which Justice Stewart joined, 77 protested the weakening of the supervisory power of the courts over members of the bar.78
Justice Powell found the majority's holding too expansive and not in the
public interest. 79 He argued that because legal services are so unique, most
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.

71. Id. at 379.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 384. The dissenting Justices joined with the Court's decision regarding the
Sherman Act but dissented against the Court granting attorney advertising First Amendment
protection. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 389.

78. Id.

79. Id. Justice Powell said, "I am apprehensive, despite the Court's expressed intent to
proceed cautiously, that today's holding will be viewed by tens of thousands of lawyers as an
invitation" by the public-spirited and the selfish lawyers alike "to engage in competitive
advertising on an escalating basis." Id. at 403.

116

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

attorney advertisements cannot help but be misleading."0 Justice Rehnquist
dissented, stating that attorney advertisement was not protected 8by the First
Amendment, regardless of the supposed benefits of advertising. '
B. Extent of Regulation Permitted:
In Re R.M.J. and the Central Hudson Test
With its decision in Bates, the Court effectively sent a message that state
bars could not subject attorney advertisement to blanket suppression and that
such advertisement is protected by the First Amendment. 2 Because the
83
Court was careful to say that advertising by attorneys could be limited,
however, state bars continued their heavy regulation. 8' Following Bates,
many states amended their attorney disciplinary rules to allow attorney
advertising, but most of these new rules banned all but a few select forms of
advertising.85
In the next important Supreme Court, attorney advertising case, In re
R.MJ, an attorney challenged a state bar rule that did not ban but
severely restricted attorney advertising. In In re R.M.J, the petitioner began
his career as a sole practitioner in Missouri.87 The petitioner mailed
professional announcement cards to a select list of addresses to promote the
opening of his new office, 88 and placed advertisements in local newspapers
and the yellow pages of the local telephone directory.89 The advertisements
included the information that the petitioner was licensed in Missouri and was
admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court.90 The advertisements
also listed areas of law in which the petitioner practiced, including personal
injury and real estate. 91
The Missouri attorney advertising rule 92 permitted attorney advertisement but restricted it to certain categories of information and specified
language. 93 Specifically, the Missouri rule limited the kind of information
that attorney advertisements could contain to ten categories: name, address,

80. Id. at 403-04.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 383.
83. Id.
84. See Snyder, supra note 9, at 362.
85. See Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under
Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 500 (1986).
86. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
87. Id. at 196.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 197. This information was in large capital letters. Id.
91. Id.
92. Mo. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-101 (13) (1978) (Index Vol.).
93. Id.; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 193.
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and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools
attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an initial consultation;
availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to
be charged for certain specified routine legal services.9 4 The language that
attorneys were permitted to use to indicate areas of practice was limited to
twenty-three phrases that described areas of law such as tort law and property
law.95 No deviation from the rule's phraseology was allowed. 96 A disclaimer stating that listing areas of practice did not indicate any certification
or expertise also was required. 97
Pursuant to this rule, the Missouri Bar98 charged the petitioner with
violating the Missouri, attorney advertising rule by listing areas of law using
phrases not approved by the state bar, for example, personal injury instead
of tort law.9 9 The Missouri Bar also charged the petitioner with violating
the advertising rule by failing to include a disclaimer of certification."
Third, it charged the petitioner with violating the rule by including
information in the advertisement outside of the ten allowed categories of
information.'
Specifically, the petitioner had listed the courts in which
he was admitted to practice. °2 Finally, the Missouri Bar charged the
03
petitioner with violating the rule against sending announcement cards.
The petitioner challenged the Missouri, attorney advertising rule under the
First Amendment. 104
The Court began its analysis of the Missouri, attorney advertising rule by
clarifying the test that would be applied to determine if state bar limitations
on attorney balancing withstood a First Amendment challenge.'0 5 The
Court applied the test it had developed for commercial speech, namely the
Central Hudson test, to attorney advertising.'" The Court indicated that

94. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 194.
95. Id. at 195. The other phrases allowed were: "administrative law," "anti-trust law,"
"appellate practice," "bankruptcy," "commercial law," "corporation law and business
organizations," "criminal law," "eminent domain law," "environmental law," "family law,"
"financial institution law," "insurance law," "labor law," "local government law," "military
law," "probate and trust law," "public utility law," "taxation law," "trial practice," and
"workers compensation law." Id. at 195 n.6.
96. Id. at 195 n.6.
97. Id.
98. Id. 455 U.S. at 197.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 196 (The Missouri Rule banning announcement cards was DR 2-102 (A)(2).).
104. Id. at 198.
105. Id. at 203.
106. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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the Central Hudson test established a four-part analysis for commercial
speech that could be applied to attorney advertising. 0 7 Under this test, the
Court must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
First, if attorney advertisements or other expressions are
Amendment.'
09
misleading or unlawful, they are not protected by the First Amendment.'
Second, in order to restrict attorney advertising that is not misleading, state
bars must establish a substantial interest that justifies the suppression of the
Third, the regulation restricting attorney
attorney advertisements." 0
advertisement must be tailored to serve the interest that justifies restricFourth, the restriction on attorney advertising must not be more
tion.'
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 2
The In re R.MJ. Court clearly articulated the test that will help state
bars, individual attorneys, and courts to determine the constitutionality of
restraints on attorney advertisements." 3 However, the Court was less
successful in applying the test to the facts of In re R.MJ."4 The Court
concentrated its reasoning on the fact that the practices that the petitioner had
engaged in were not misleading." 5 Hence, the Court reasoned that none
on attorney advertising could be sustained under the
of the three restrictions
6
First Amendment."
Thus, the precedential value of In re R.MJ. is questionable." 7 It is
clear that the states can regulate advertising that is misleading." 8 But
whether the state has a substantial interest in regulating attorney advertising
and to what extent, short of a complete ban, attorney advertising could be
regulated remain unanswered.
Ill.

IN-PERSON SOLICITATION: PROPHYLACTIC BANS

The Supreme Court has allowed general prohibitions of in-person
solicitation by attorneys, in contrast to its decision on regulating attorney
advertising." 9 The Court has held that states may discipline attorneys for

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In re R.MJ, 455 U.S. at 202.
110. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
11. See id.
112. See id.
113. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202.
114. See id. at 206.
115. Id. at 204-06.
116. Id. at 206.
117. See John Ratino, Note, In Re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension of FirstAmendment
Protectionto Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 729, 757 (1983) (arguing the In re
R.MJ standard is easier for states to comply with than the CentralHudson standard).
118. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 202.
119. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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soliciting clients in person for pecuniary gain. 20 It has allowed the states
the discretion to place complete, prophylactic bans on solicitation by
attorneys.'12 The goal of allowing such prophylactic bans is to prevent the
harm that can be caused by solicitation."
The decision to allow the
complete ban of in-person solicitation by attorneys came in Ohralik v. Ohio
2
State Bar Ass 'n. 1
Ohralik was an Ohio attorney who practiced tort law. 24 Ohralik
learned of an accident in which Carol McClintock, an eighteen-year-old
woman, and an other young woman had been injured. 125 Because he was
casually acquainted with Carol McClintock, 26 Ohralik telephoned and then
visited her parents, who informed Ohralik that Carol was in the hospital. 2 7
The McClintocks also told Ohralik that Carol would have to decide for
28
herself whether she wanted to retain an attorney.
29
Ohralik then visited Carol in the hospital where she was in traction.
Carol would not sign an agreement to retain Ohralik's services as an attorney
without first discussing the issue with her parents. 3 ° She asked Ohralik to
tell her parents to come and talk to her about hiring an attorney."' Ohralik
then went back to the McClintock residence, this time hiding a tape recorder
under his rain coat. 32 The McClintocks told Ohralik that Carol had
phoned to say that Ohralik could represent her, and two days later she signed
133
a contract in her hospital room.
Ohralik also obtained from the McClintocks the name of Carol's
passenger at the time of the accident, Wanda Lou Holbert. 34 Uninvited,
Ohralik visited Wanda Lou and convinced her to allow him to represent her
for any possible claims. 135 Wanda's mother called Ohralik the next day
and told him that she and her daughter
did not want to sue anyone and did
136
them.
represent
to
him
not want

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 463.
123. Id. at 447.
124. Id. at 449.
125. Id. While picking up his mail at the post office, Ohralik learned of the accident from
the postman's brother. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 450.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 45 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 451-52.
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Both the McClintocks and the Holberts filed grievances against
Ohralik.'37 The Ohio Supreme Court's Grievance Committee recommended
that Ohralik be sanctioned with a public reprimand for his violation of the
Ohio rule against attorney solicitation.13
The Ohio Supreme Court
increased the sanction to indefinite suspension.' 3 9 Ohralik appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that the Ohio rule prohibiting solicitation
by
140
attorneys violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment.
The Court distinguished this case from Bates v. State Bar ofArizona and
determined that in-person solicitation by attorneys was not entitled to the
kind of protection that attorney advertising was under the First Amendment.1 41 The Court noted that attorney advertising and attorney solicitation
are similar in that they both provide potential consumers of legal services
with information about the availability of the services. 42 The Court
reasoned, however, that attorney advertising and attorney solicitation also are
dissimilar in that attorney solicitation exerts more pressure and encourages
uninformed decisionmaking. 43 The Court found a strong state interest in
protecting the public from the pressure of attorney solicitation.'4 It held
that the state had a compelling interest in preventing the danger of fraud,
undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching that can accompany
solicitation.4 4 The dangers of solicitation, the Court held, warranted a
complete, prophylactic ban on solicitation.'4
However, in In re Primus,1' the Court carved a narrow exception to
its stance that attorney solicitation was not protected by the First Amendment. 48 The Court said solicitation of prospective clients by nonprofit
organizations for political, nonpecuniary reasons was protected by the First

137. Id. at 452. Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert filed complaints against
Ohralik with the Grievance Committee of the Geauga County Bar Ass'n. Id. The County Bar
Ass'n referred the grievance to the Ohio State Bar Ass'n. Id.
138. Id. at 453-54.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Ohio rule read in pertinent part, "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice
to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103A
(1920).
141. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 462. The Court said, "[l]t can hardly be said that the potential for overreaching
is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured or distressed lay person." Id. at 465.

146. Id.
147. 436 U.S. 412 (1978)
148. Id. at 437-38.
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Amendment. 4 9 In sum, nonprofit organizations with nonpecuniary motives
still may solicit clients, but in-person solicitation is not an option for other
attorneys who want to market their services. °
IV. TARGETED, ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS: THE MIDDLE GROUND
A.

Targeted, Newspaper Advertisements

An attorney's newspaper advertisement, featuring a drawing of a Dalkon
The adverShield intrauterine device, asked, "Did you use this IUD?''
tisement stated that if the reader had used the Dalkon Shield and been injured
by it, she could be entitled to compensation."2 Finally, the advertisement
told the reader that the law firm running the advertisement had handled
Dalkon Shield cases in the past and could take the reader's case on a
contingency basis." 3 This advertisement led to Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel and the Supreme Court's decision on targeted
advertisements by attorneys."5
In addition to attracting over 200 inquiries 5 ' from potential clients,
Zauderer, the attorney who ran the Dalkon Shield advertisement, attracted the
attention of the state disciplinary board. 5 6 Zauderer was charged with
violating Ohio's disciplinary rules on attorney advertising that prohibited the
use of illustrations in advertisements, false and deceptive statements in legal
advertisements, and attorneys from accepting employment from persons to
whom they had furnished unsolicited legal advice.'57 The Ohio rules
required attorney advertisements to be "dignified" and limited the information
that attorney advertisements could contain.' 58 Taken together, the rules
forbade soliciting or accepting legal employment through targeted advertisements. 9 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Zauderer's actions

149. Id.
150. See Evan R. Levy, Note, Edenfield v. Fane: In-person Solicitation by Professionals
Revisited - What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L. REv. 261, 276 (1994) (arguing that

an outright ban on attorney solicitation is inconsistent with the Court's other commercial
speech decisions that disallowed categorical bans because the Court ignored the potential
benefits of nondeceptive in-person solicitation).
151. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 630 (1985).
152. Id. at 631.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. Of the 200 inquiries, 106 became clients. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 632-33. The Ohio rules were Ohio Disciplinary Rule 1-101(A) & -101(B).
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632-33.
158. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632.
159. Id.
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warranted a public reprimand."6 Zauderer appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, contending that Ohio's Disciplinary Rules violated the First Amendment.'
The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did protect this kind
of targeted, newspaper advertisement.1 62 Following the Central Hudson
test, 163 the analysis that the Court had applied to other attorney advertising
cases, 164 the Court first determined that the Dalkon Shield advertisement
was not misleading. 165 It reasoned that the information contained in the
Dalkon Shield advertisement was not false or deceptive, although there had
been many lawsuits alleging injuries caused by the Dalkon shield."6
The next step was to determine if there was a substantial government
interest promoted by the Ohio rules prohibiting targeted advertisements. 67
The Court found no such substantial government interest, 68 and reasoned
that the interests involved in protecting individuals against the abuses
possible from in-person solicitation did not manifest themselves in targeted
advertisements. 69 The Court distinguished Ohralik170 by noting in dicta
that print advertising poses much less risk of overreaching than in-person
solicitation.''
The Court dismissed the traditional argument that the ban on targeted
advertisements protected against the fear that attorneys would "stir up
litigation."'' 72 The Court reasoned that litigation cannot be said to be an
"evil" against which one needs to be protected, 73 and therefore, this
argument was not sufficient justification for banning truthful, nondeceptive
advertisements. 74 Similarly, it75 found no substantial interests in banning
illustrations in advertisements.
In sum, the Court in Zauderer gave targeted, newspaper attorney
advertisements the same kind of protection it had given general, newspaper
attorney advertisements. 76 It found no compelling reason why targeted,
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 637.
See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.; see, e.g., In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 197.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 641-42
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 477.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 635.
Id.at 642.
Id.
Id.at 643.
Id.at 647.
Id.;
see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
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newspaper advertisements should be limited.177 Thus, targeted, newspaper
advertisements
are a valid option for attorneys who want to market their
78
services.1
B.

Targeted,Direct-mail Solicitation

The Supreme Court has continued to protect the right of attorneys to
market their services by disallowing bans that prevent attorneys from sending
truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients. 79 The Court first
addressed the issue of targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attorneys in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n."0 Shapero was an attorney who had
applied to Kentucky's Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a
letter he wanted to send to persons who had had foreclosure suits filed
against them. 81' The letter advised potential clients, "[Y]ou may be about
to lose your home" and "[I]t may surprise you what I may be able to do for
you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter."' 8 2
The Commission did not approve the letter because of a Kentucky rule
that prohibited the mailing of attorney advertisements "precipitated by a
specific event ... involving or relating to the addressee . as distinct from
the general public.' 8 3 The Kentucky Supreme Court held invalid the
Kentucky Bar rule that prohibited direct-mail solicitation and replaced it with
Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules.'84 Rule 7.3 also prohibits direct-mail solicitation. 8 5 However, the court did not say how Rule 7.3 cured the previous
Kentucky rule. " 6
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sending letters to
potential clients constituted commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment. 8 7 The Court applied the Central Hudson test to the Kentucky
rule prohibiting targeted, direct-mail solicitation.8 8
According to the
Central Hudson test, targeted, direct-mail solicitation that is not misleading
may only be restricted when there is a substantial governmental interest
advanced by such restriction.8 9 The government interest proposed by the

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646.
Id. at 646-47.
See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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Kentucky Supreme Court was that targeted, direct-mail solicitation by an
attorney of a prospective client, overwhelmed by legal problems, creates the
potential for undue influence, as did in-person solicitation in Ohralik.9 °
It
The Court did not find that such a governmental interest existed. 9
reasoned that persons are much less likely to be unduly influenced by a letter
than by the presence of an attorney,'92 because consumers could simply put
the letters aside, consider them later, ignore them, or even throw them
away. 193
Though the Shapero Court prohibited the ban of targeted, direct-mail
advertisements, it, in dicta, opened channels that states could use to regulate
this form of attorney marketing. 94 The Court reasoned that one of the
reasons it would not allow an outright ban of targeted, direct-mail advertisements is that they were easy to regulate.' 95 States could require that the
attorney prove any fact stated in the letter, the letter be marked as an
advertisement, or an agency review of such letters before they are sent.' 96
By stating in dicta that direct-mail advertisements were easy to regulate, the
Court opened the door for more regulation of this type of attorney marketing.'9 7 It addressed how much regulation would be allowed in its next
targeted, direct-mail advertising case, Went For It, Inc.' 98
C.

Time PeriodBans on Targeted, Direct-mailAdvertisements

In Went For It, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case dealing with
time period bans on targeted, direct-mail advertisements.'" The Court
decided that it would uphold under the Constitution a Florida rule imposing
a thirty-day ban on direct-mail, attorney advertising that solicited personal
injury or wrongful death clients.200 The case came to the Supreme Court
following a holding by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
that such a ban on direct-mail, attorney advertising violated commercial
speech protection under the First Amendment.20 '
McHenry, an attorney, regularly sent letters to prospective personal injury

190. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447.
191. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 475-76.
194. Id. at 479.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. McHenry v. The Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1045 (11 th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub. nom.,
The Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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and wrongful death clients. 0 2 McHenry sued the state bar when it promulgated a new rule prohibiting attorneys from soliciting personal injury and
wrongful death clients "unless the accident or disaster occurred more than
thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication. ' , 20 3 Other attorneys
joined in the suit alleging that, but for the rule, they would send direct-mail
advertisements within thirty days of an accident or disaster.2"
Before the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida Bar submitted two government
interests.0 5 First, the Bar contended that the thirty-day ban protected
persons traumatized by recent injury.2" It argued the emotional state of
these persons inhibited their ability to objectively evaluate targeted, directmail advertising from an attorney.20 7 Second, it submitted that the thirtyday ban protected victims of recent personal injury or death from disturbance. 20 8 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that neither interest was substantial enough to justify the ban.20 9
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the spectrum of
Supreme Court decisions on attorney advertising. 210 The Eleventh Circuit
decided that the advertisement was not like attorney solicitation and
therefore, could not be banned for any length of time.2 " The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, reversed and held
22
that the thirty-day ban withstood constitutional scrutiny.
In reaching its decision, the Court applied the CentralHudson test to the
thirty-day ban. 213 The Central Hudson test requires that, in order for a
restriction on commercial speech to be constitutional, there must be a
substantial governmental interest advanced by the restriction. 24 Before the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Florida Bar asserted different governmental interests
than it had before the lower courts. 2 5 The Florida Bar argued that it had
a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal
injury victims and the reputation of Florida attorneys.2 6 The Court found
that there was a substantial governmental interest in protecting the privacy

202. Id. at 1040.
203.

FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(A).

204.
205.
206.
207.

McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1040.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.at 1045.
Id.
Went For It,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
Id.at 2376.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
See McHenry,21 F.3d at 1038.
Went For It,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
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and health of Florida citizens and preventing the erosion of the legal profession.217
In support of its finding that there was a substantial governmental
interest, the Court pointed to a two-year study the Florida Bar had conducted
on the effects of attorney advertising on public opinion.2 18 The summary
contained data supporting that the Florida public viewed direct-mail
solicitation as an intrusion on privacy, which reflected poorly on the legal
profession.2" 9 The Court went on to hold that the thirty-day ban was
reasonably well tailored to meet the state's objectives, and that there were
many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about the availability of legal
representation during the thirty-day period.22 ° Accordingly, the court held
that the time period ban on direct-mail solicitation passed constitutional
muster.221
The Court was careful to distinguish the Shapero decision.222 It held
that, in Shapero, the asserted governmental interest had been an avoidance
of overreaching.223 In contrast, the asserted interest in Went For It, Inc.
was to protect the public from offensive intrusion into their privacy and to
protect the image of Florida attorneys. 2 4 The Went For It, Inc. governmental interest was different from that225in Shapero and hence, deemed
substantial enough to withstand scrutiny.
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,226 Justice Kennedy
dissented, contending that there was no substantial state interest asserted.227
The dissent argued that the majority departed from precedent by finding a
substantial government interest in protecting the public from offensive
advertisements.228 The dissent pointed to the Shapero case, in which the
targeted advertisement was allowed because there was no danger of
overreaching or undue influence in targeted, direct-mail advertisements.229
Just because some individuals might be offended by a solicitation, the dissent
reasoned, does not mean that such a solicitation can be suppressed under the
First Amendment.2 30

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 2377.
Id.
Id. at 2378.
Id. at 2381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2382.
Id.
Id. at 2383.
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The dissent also attacked the Court's reliance on the Florida Bar's
"study.""2 3 The dissent pointed out that the study contained no explanation
of its procedures, methodology, or statistical framework and for that reason,
could not be seen as a valid basis for a Supreme Court decision.232 Even
if there were a substantial government interest, the dissent went on to argue
that the thirty-day ban did not advance the state interest in a material
3
23

way.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court sharply departed from its previous protection of
attorney commercial speech in the Went For It, Inc. decision. Before Went
for It, Inc., the Court allowed most forms of attorney marketing with the
exception of in-person solicitation.234 Previously, it had reasoned that
forms of attorney marketing other than solicitation should not be severely
restricted because they pose less hazard of overreaching than in-person
solicitation.2 35 After all, the recipient of a direct-mail advertisement could
simply throw the letter away. Likewise, a person could refuse to read a
newspaper advertisement.
In deciding Went for It, Inc., the Court took a step backwards and sent
a message to state bar organizations that severe regulation of attorney
advertising would be tolerated. It seems that gradual erosion of limitations
on attorneys to market their services has ended. Ironically, the Court chose
to limit Constitutional protection at a time when attorneys are forced by
economic pressures to seek marketing methods other than word-of-mouth to
generate business.236 In order to avoid offending the public and to protect
the image of attorneys, the Court has reduced constitutional protection of
attorney advertising. By allowing a restriction on attorney advertising, it has
inadvertently handicapped the ability of attorneys to market their services
and, in the process, has hindered the public in obtaining legal advice at a fair
price.
231. Id. at 2384.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Shapero,486 U.S. at 466 (disallowing a complete ban of targeted direct-mail
solicitation); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626 (disallowing a ban of targeted, newspaper advertisements); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 477 (allowing a prophylactic ban of attorney, in-person
solicitation).
235. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 466.
236. See Justice Stewart, ProfessionalEthics for the Business Lawyer: The Morals of the
Market Place, 31 Bus. LAW. 463, 466-67 (1975). At the 1975 meeting of the ABA, Justice
Stewart of the Supreme Court said that "lawyers are primarily economic actors, men and
women who perform a service for profit ...and the members of the public, the consumers
of lawyers services, are best served if there is true competition among lawyers for their
patronage." Id.
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